Rendered at 21:22:07 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) with Cloudflare Workers.
bob1029 1 days ago [-]
> ECC algorithms with smaller key sizes would be more vulnerable to a
quantum attack, as it would require a currently theoretical quantum computer with fewer qubits than would be required for an RSA key with the same cryptographic strength [25].
This is what keeps me skeptical about ECC. RSA is really chunky, and maybe that's a fundamental advantage from an information theory perspective. Compromising on the crypto scheme because we can't fit inside UDP seems like a cursed path.
I find it silly to throw huge amounts of resources away worrying about quantum attacks that won't get burned on something as silly as this week's DNS if it happens to be protected at all. If you are making a 30 year root and/or document signing then worry.
phicoh 1 days ago [-]
If we are looking at the RSA factoring challenge (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Factoring_Challenge) then 768 bits is done. Breaking RSA 1024 is assumed to be possible but has not been demonstrated in public.
So maybe quantum computers should first complete some of these RSA challenges with less compute resources than done classically before considering any claims about qubits needs as practical.
All of this in the context of DNSSEC or other system using signatures. For encryption the story is different.
tptacek 1 days ago [-]
A CRQC makes both RSA and ECDLP practically irrelevant. The qubit thresholds between available ECC and RSA-2048 don't look meaningful. If you're worried about QC, get comfortable with lattices.
Of course, this part of the NIST recommendation doesn't matter, because DNSSEC is moribund. If we want post-quantum record authenticity, we should go back to the drawing board and come up with something that doesn't depend on UDP (and that doesn't carry DNSSEC's 1994-vintage offline-signer compromise and all-or-nothing zone signature compromise).
gumarn_y 1 days ago [-]
Yeah if we will ever see a CRQC...but nevertheless we will migrate to PQC as it will be forced via regulations thx to lobby work by Mosca and friends
progbits 1 days ago [-]
> 864000 seconds (1 day)
Could use some proofreading.
antonyh 1 days ago [-]
I do wish these types of document were published as HTML and not just as PDF.
layer8 1 days ago [-]
It would be nice if there was an HTML/A standard. Though this document isn’t PDF/A either.
kgwxd 1 days ago [-]
Firefox makes it look like HTML with pdf.js. Wouldn't it be trivial to make something that puts a PDF through that same filter and saves the results to a file? Or do you mean by default so you can just read it in a browser without PDF support?
antonyh 8 hours ago [-]
For my use case, I use a webclipper to drop a copy of the text as Markdown into Joplin as a personal knowledge base. I can't do this with a PDF. My browser downloads the document by default as a preference for user manuals etc that I would want to keep, but for this kind of content a simple web page would be a better choice.
For other users, PDF is well known for lack of accessibility and I hear that it's a poor choice for screen readers but I have little direct knowledge on that.
I'd rather HTML with named anchors so I can link from documents/pages directly to subsections with hyperlinks. This would make it more useful professionally given it's a document that should be referenced by other works.
vablings 3 hours ago [-]
sigh, PDF is anything but trivial sadly. It is a horrible creature from the bowels of hell. I do wish there was a web document standard that was printable and also editable without dropping a nuclear bomb
This is what keeps me skeptical about ECC. RSA is really chunky, and maybe that's a fundamental advantage from an information theory perspective. Compromising on the crypto scheme because we can't fit inside UDP seems like a cursed path.
[25]: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06752
So maybe quantum computers should first complete some of these RSA challenges with less compute resources than done classically before considering any claims about qubits needs as practical.
All of this in the context of DNSSEC or other system using signatures. For encryption the story is different.
Of course, this part of the NIST recommendation doesn't matter, because DNSSEC is moribund. If we want post-quantum record authenticity, we should go back to the drawing board and come up with something that doesn't depend on UDP (and that doesn't carry DNSSEC's 1994-vintage offline-signer compromise and all-or-nothing zone signature compromise).
Could use some proofreading.
For other users, PDF is well known for lack of accessibility and I hear that it's a poor choice for screen readers but I have little direct knowledge on that.
I'd rather HTML with named anchors so I can link from documents/pages directly to subsections with hyperlinks. This would make it more useful professionally given it's a document that should be referenced by other works.